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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The present thesis focuses on changes in the person's

self concept.

the outset.

Thus it will be useful to define this term at
As used here the term self concept refers to

a

set of abstractions which the person constructs about him/

herself as an object.

Such abstractions are based on past

experience and function to allow the person to represent
past experience, interpret new experience, plan and organize
future behavior, and present him/herself to others.

To lo-

cate the present analysis in terms of past analyses of the
self concept it will be useful to refer to four distinctions

suggested by Gordon and Gergen (1968):

the self as fact vs.

construct; the self as subject vs. object; the self as structure vs. process; and the self as single vs. multiple.

The distinction between the self as fact vs

.

construct

is made necessary because many analyses of the self concept

suggest that it is some physical entity.

Here the self con-

cept is viewed as an abstract construction of the person

with no tangible physical properties.
The distinction between the self as subject vs

.

object

dates back at least to James (1910), and has more recently

been emphasized by Allport (1955) and Epstein (1973).

The

self concept may refer to the object of knowledge and experi-

ence or to the organizer and initiator of experience.

The

focus here is upon the self concept as the object of
knowledge.
The present analysis deals with the process rather than
the structure of the self concept.

Rather than focus on the

way in which many possible self concepts are organized into
structures, the present focus is on the processes by which

changes are affected in discrete aspects of the self concept.
Finally, the present analysis deals with but

dimension of the person's self concept.

a

single

It is assumed that

the person has many concepts of him/herself; however, for

purposes of achieving clarity, the present analysis deals
with changes in
cept.

a

single dimension of the person's self con-

Future analyses must assess the generality of the pre-

sent analysis in the context of the many concepts that peo-

ple have of themselves.
In general, the present approach is to develop

a

sim-

plified model of changes in limited aspects of the person's
self concept.

1974) has cogently argued,

As Wylie (1968,

grand scale about the self

past attempts to speculate on

a

concept have usually led to

morass of uninterpretable re-

a

search and/or unverified clinical speculation, whereas the
study of "lower-order constructs" has led to more productive

research.

Once

a

reliable base of observation has been es-

tablished it becomes possible to gradually assimilate further complexities.

)

3

Definition of the Self Concept
One operational definition of the person's self concept

involves simply asking subjects the question:

"Who are you?"

and having them respond in an open-ended format.

Gordon

(1968) reported a series of studies where subjects responded

with 20 answers to the above question.

Subjects' responses

were classified as either categorical or attributive.

Cate-

gorical self concepts refer to those responses where subjects

define themselves in terms of membership (or non-member shj p
in various social groups (e.g. Catholic, male, member of the

track team, etc.).

Attributive self concepts refer to re-

sponses where subjects define themselves in terms of where

they stand, relative to some implicit or explicit reference
group, on various dimensions (e.g. friendly, honest, athletic, intelligent, etc.).

Most responses to the "Who am I?"

question are attributive; and, furthermore, categorical self
concepts often derive much of their importance from the at-

tributive implications of membership in
(Gordon, 1968).

a

particular group

The present thesis deals only with attribu-

tive self concepts.

This follows from the need to maintain

simplicity and from the fact that past research has dealt
almost exclusively with attributive self concepts (cf.
Jones, Sensenig, and Haley,

1974).

The person's self rating on

a

given attribute refers to

others
an estimate of his/her average standing relative to

on that attribute.

In "computing" such an average it is as-

sumed that the person compares the frequency
and degree to

which s/he exhibits behavior that is related to
the attribute in question with the frequency and degree to
which
others exhibit similar behavior.

In most studies subjects

are free to specify which "others" they will compare them-

selves to (e.g. Gordon, 1968), while other studies have subjects compare themselves with
(e.g.

a

common group of "others"

O'Brien, 1971, had subjects compare themselves to

"other college freshmen").
The person "knows" where s/he stands on

bute because of past experience.

a

given attri-

The types of experience

which determine the person's self rating include:
from others, performance on objective tests,
son processes, and subjective judgments.

feedback

social compari-

Much of Festinger'

(1954) analysis of social comparison processes can readily

be extrapolated to deal with the person's evaluation of the

attributes which comprise part of his/her self concept
(Bowerman, 1971; Pettigrew, 1967).

Changes in Self Concepts
With the above considerations in mind it is now possible to discuss changes in the person's self concept.

Such

changes result from success and failure experiences which
will be defined and discussed below.
The person's self concept allows him/her to anticipate

future experience.

That is, by remembering past events the

person comes to anticipate what will happen in the future

(Kelly,

1955).

Success and failure in the present
analysis

refer to cases where the person's actual
performance relative to an attribute of his/her self concept
deviates mark-

edly from the person's expected performance.

Expected per-

formance refers to some range of possible outcomes
which the
person would interpret as being consistent with his/her

aver-

age self concept on some dimension.

Faced with

a

discrepancy between expected and actual

performance, the person must explain the causes of his/her

performance.

Many possible attributions are possible for

this discrepancy.

On the one hand the person may explain

the discrepancy by concluding that s/he is either higher or

lower than s/he had previously thought on the attribute in
question.

On the other hand many attributions are available

which do not imply that the person should change his/her
self concept.

formance on

a

For example, if the discrepancy involves pertest,

the person can attribute the discrepancy

between expected and actual performance to transient emotional states (Averill, in press); luck (Rotter, Chance, and
Phares, 1972; Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosen1

baum, 1972); characteristics of the test (O'Brien, 1971);

characteristics of the person administering the test (Steiner,

1968); or the conditions under which the test was admi-

nistered (Bowerman, 1971).

All of these possibilities were

suggested in Heider's (1958) seminal analysis.

All of these

latter attributions imply that the person will not change his

her self concept.

Thus failure on

a

test will not lead to

self concept change if the person was
emotionally upset during the test, if the test was a poor
one, if the test scorer
was incompetent, or if distracting conditions
existed during
the test.
The present model distinguishes only between two
types

of attributions for

performance:
on

a

a)

a

discrepancy between expected and actual

an internal attribution to one's standing

particular attribute; and b) attributions which are

either external to the person or which involve transient

emotional states.

Attribution to this second set of causes

does not lead to any changes in the person's self concept.
(For convenience of reference this latter set of attribu-

tions will be referred to as "external" attributions.)
the present model assumes

a

Thus

clear isomorphism between self

concept change and the attribution of responsibility.

A

close link is also proposed between self concept change, at-

tribution for success and failure, and emotion.

To the ex-

tent that the person internalizes responsibility for success (thus raising his/her self concept), s/he will report

feelings of elation and calmness; and, to the extent that
the person accepts responsibility for failure (thus lowering

his/her self concept), s/he will report feelings of depression and anxiety.

A final link to be mentioned here suggests that the

amount of self concept change following success and failure

is related to the amount of and
the quality of the information that the person has about
his/her standing on a given
attribute.
Presumably, people with much reliable
information about their standing on a given
attribute will change
their self concepts following success
and failure to a lesser
extent than people who have little or no
reliable information
about their standing. Rotter (1954) reported
experimental

evidence which is consistent with the above hypothesis.
Subjects with little experience on

a

level of aspiration

(LOA) task showed greater changes in their LOA
following the

presentation of feedback that was highly discrepant from
their past performance than did subjects who had had

a

great

deal of prior experience.
The present thesis includes correlational tests of the

above-noted links between self concept change, attributions
for success and failure, mood, and prior information about

one's self concept.
Situational Determinants of Response

tc

Success and Failure

The evidence to be summarized below suggests that

a

general bias exists in responses to success and failure such
that subjects are more likely to accept (i.e. internalize

responsibility for and change their self concepts accordingly)

success than failure feedback.

An important limit to

this tendency concerns situations where subjects expect to

undergo further public evaluation.

In such situations it is

hypothesized that subjects are more likely to accept the im-

.

8

Plications of failure than success
feedback.
considered below concerns whether
subjects'

Another issue
responses to

feedback in situations where they expect
further public
evaluation are best explained in terms of
self concept
change or in terms of changes in strategic
self presenta•

tion.

The self-enhancement hypothesis.

The self -enhancement

hypothesis suggests that responses to success and failure
are in part determined by the hedonic value of these
two

outcomes.

If the person's reaction to success and failure

depended only on an objective analysis of the feedback

"data'-

s/he would be as affected by failure as by success feedback.

The self-enhancement hypothesis, however, suggests that peo-

ple are guick to seize upon successes, and egually quick to

explain away failures.

To the extent that people exhibit

such a bias, their self concepts will be somewhat more posi-

tive than the concepts that others hold toward them.

Ber-

trand Russell provided an excellent (if somewhat overstated)

example of the self-enhancement process:
we will say, a playwright; to every unbiased person it must be obvious that I am the
most brilliant playwright of the age. Nevertheless, for some reason, my plays are seldom performed and when they are , they are not successful
What is the explanation for this strange state of
affairs? Obviously, that managers actors and
critics have combined against me for one reason or
another.
The reason, of course is highly creditable to myself
I have ref u sed to kowtow to the
great ones of the theatrical world I have not
flattered the critics, my plays contain home
truths which are unbearable to those whom they hit.
I am,

,

,

,

:

,

,

•

And so my transcendent merit languishes
unrecoqnized (quoted in Heider, 1958,
p. 171).

Empirical support for the self-enhancement
hypothesis
can be found in social comparison and attribution
studies,

and these will be discussed below.

assume the existence of

a

Several other theories

self-enhancement motive but have

yet to demonstrate clear empirical support for such
tive:

level of aspiration theory (Lewin et al

gory,

.

,

1944;

1966), cognitive dissonance theory (Rosenberg,

Smith,
1954).

1968), and self theory (Epstein,

1973;

mo-

a

Dig-

1968;

Sullivan*

These theories will not be elaborated here.

Festinger's social comparison theory (1954) began with
the assumption that people are motivated toward self -enhancement.

Empirical support for this assumption has been re-

ported by Wheeler, Shaver, Jones, Goethals, Cooper, Robinson, Gruder,

(1971).

and Butzine (19 69), and by Wilson and Benner

Social comparison research commonly employs an

experimental situation where the subject receives
amount of information about

a

a

minimal

group of other subjects and is

then asked to choose which of these others s/he wants to

learn more about.

Thus subjects might take

a

test and re-

ceive feedback about their own raw score and rank within

particular reference group.

Subjects then are given

to learn the score of another member of the group.

a

a

chance

The de-

pendent variable in such studies is the subject's reference
choice.

,

10

_

et al

In su PPort of the self-enhancement hypothesis,
Wheeler
.

(1969) found that subjects who expected to actually

interact with their referent chose referents with less
ability than did subjects who did not expect such interaction.
Similarly, Wilson and Benner (1971) found that subjects who

expected to publicly compete with their referent chose referents with less ability than did subjects who did not expect
such competition.

Subjects, then, tend to avoid face-to-

face social comparisons with better-off others, especially

where competition is involved; but yet engage in "wish fulfilling" comparisons with better-off others when the referent poses no threat to the subject's self-esteem.

Within an attribution theory framework, Bowerman (19 71)
has argued that people tend to internalize responsibility for

successes and externalize responsibility for failures

enhancing their self concepts.

— thus

Several studies have found

evidence consistent with such an hypothesis (Eagly, 1967;
O'Brien, 1971; Steiner, 1968).

Each of these studies held

constant the size of the discrepancy between subjects' ex-

pected and actual (i.e. manipulated) performance while varying the valence of the feedback.

The dependent variables

employed in these studies were not explicitly attributional
but are conceptually related to attributional measures.

Eagly (1967) gave half of her male subjects feedback
which was better and gave the other half feedback which was

worse than their initial self rating of assertiveness

.

After

11

receiving the feedback, subjects rated their
perceptions of
its accuracy, and success feedback was rated as
more accurate than failure feedback.

In a similar study,

timated how well they would perform on
(O'Brien,

1971).

a

subjects es-

vocabulary test

Subjects then took the test, received feed-

back which was either better or worse than they expected,
and evaluated the accuracy and validity of the test.

It was

found that subjects in the success condition evaluated the
test as being more accurate and valid than did subjects in
the failure condition.

Steiner (1968) presented subjects with feedback which

purportedly reflected their scores on

a

personality test.

Half of the subjects received success and half received
failure feedback after which they rated the accuracy of the

personality tests and the competency of the person who had
scored them.

Subjects in the success condition rated the

test interpreter as being more competent than did subjects
in the failure condition.

No difference, however, was found

between the experimental groups in their ratings of the accuracy of the personality tests.
Several other similar studies have manipulated valence
of feedback without taking into account subjects' initial

performance expectancies and have also obtained support for
the "internalize the good
(Beckman, 1970; Fitch,

— externalize

1970;

the bad" hypothesis

Streufert and Streufert, 1969;

and Wortman, Costanzo, and Witt, 1973).

These studies must

12

be interpreted with caution, however,

since the failure to

control for initial performance expectancies
means that the
results might be attributable to the fact that

subjects' ex-

pectancies were simply less discrepant from the success
feedback than from the failure feedback, as has been
argued
by Bern (1972, pp. 40-42). New information which
is highly

discrepant from past information that the person has about
him/herself tends to be rejected (i.e. responsibility is externalized)

.

The self-enhancement hypothesis led to the following

predictions in the present study:

a)

subjects will change

their self concepts more toward success than toward failure
feedback; b) subjects will tend to attribute success to in-

ternal factors and failure to external factors;

c)

subjects

will evaluate the source of feedback more favorably following success than failure.

An important case where the above hypotheses should not
hold is discussed below.

Expectancy of further public evaluation.

Two studies

suggest an important qualification to the self-enhancement

hypothesis

— in

situations that are relatively public and/or

that involve having subjects expect to be evaluated in the
near future, subjects tend to respond to feedback in

effacing rather than
sen,

a

a

self-

self -enhancing manner (Eagly and Ack-

1971; Feather and Simon,

1971).

Feather and Simon (1971) measured subjects' attributions

13

for their performance on a test after half of them
had failed and half had succeeded (feedback was manipulated
so that

the discrepancy between initial self concept and the
feed-

back was held constant).

It was found, unexpectedly,

that

subjects tended to attribute their own successes to external

factors and their own failures to internal factors, whereas

they tended to attribute the successes of others to internal
factors and the failures of others to external factors.

These data were explained post hoc by reference to the fact
that the situation was

a

very public one and subjects may

have felt that their self-evaluative (and other-evaluative)

behavior was itself being monitored.

Subjects'

self-effac-

ing responses may, therefore, have been due to their desire
to avoid the appearance of immodesty or unfairness.

The Eagly and Acksen (1971) study dealt with self con-

cept change following success and failure (again, the dis-

crepancy between initial self concept and the feedback was
held constant).

A second factor in the design placed half

of the subjects in the "expectancy of further public evalu-

ation" condition where subjects expected that as soon as

they had filled out the post-feedback questionnaire they

would be tested again.

The other half of the subjects were

not informed of the future testing.

Subjects who expected

to be tested again changed their self concepts more toward

failure than toward success feedback, whereas subjects who
did not expect to be tested again changed their self concepts

14

more toward success than toward failure
feedback.
Eagly and
Acksen argued that the self-effacing
responses observed in
the expectancy of further evaluation
conditions were due to
the negative social sanctions that occur
when people
over-

estimate their ability, but not when they
underestimate
their ability.

et al.

A similar analysis was offered by Wortman

(1973) who found that subjects who expected public

evaluation reported having less of the ability in question
than did subjects who did not expect such evaluation.
The present study attempts to replicate the Eagly and

Acksen (1971) study by manipulating the valence of feedback
and the expectancy of further public evaluation while obser-

ving subjects' attributions, and self concept changes fol-

lowing feedback.
Self presentation vs

.

self concept change .

A plausible

interpretation of the Eagly and Acksen and the Feather and
Simon studies is that subjects' self-effacing responses to

feedback may have reflected their strategic self presentations rather than actual self concept change.

A useful pa-

rallel to the self concept vs. self presentation distinction
can be found in the social learning theory distinction be-

tween performance and learning (Bandura, 1965, 1969; Mischel,
1968).

Bandura (1965) demonstrated that subjects' perform-

ances may differ from their enduring performance capabilities
(learning), depending on the reinforcement contingencies op-

erating in the situation.

Similarly, the person's self con-

15

cept is presumed to be an enduring
characteristic

of the

person, whereas the person's self presentation
is presumed
to be more a function of the perceived
reinforcement contingencies operating in the situation.
It is argued here that the effects reported by
Eagly

and Acksen and by Feather and Simon involved changes
in subjects'

self presentations rather than changes in their self

concepts.

To support this argument the present study will,

first of all, replicate the Eagly and Acksen (1971) study.
The expectancy of further public evaluation will then be

taken away and subjects will fill out another questionnaire

where they will again rate their self concepts.

It is pre-

dicted that subjects who expect further public evaluation
will react to feedback in

a

self-effacing manner, relative

to subjects who do not expect such evaluation, "but that when

the expectancy of further evaluation is removed, no differ-

ences will be found in the self concept ratings of these two
groups.

Such chameleon-like changes in self rating would

suggest that subjects' self presentations are more at issue

than their enduring self concepts.
Trait Determinants of Response to Success and Failure

Self-esteem

.

Several studies suggest that the self-

evaluative behaviors of subjects at different levels of selfesteem may be quite different (Eagly, 1967; Fitch, 1973;
Stroebe, Stroebe, and Eagly, 1974).

These studies suggest

that high self-esteem subjects react to feedback in more of

16

self-enhancing manner than low self-esteem
subjects.
Stroebe et al. (1974) told high and low
self-esteem
subjects that their personalities had been
evaluated by ana

other subject.

In fact all the evaluations were written
by

the experimenters and were either positively or
negatively

worded.

After receiving the feedback subjects indicated

whether they thought the evaluation was honest or whether
it
was due to role-playing instructions which had forced
the
evaluator to write an unrealistic evaluation.

High self-

esteem subjects more often than low self-esteem subjects in-

dicated that negative evaluations were due to role-playing

instructions and that positive evaluations were honest ones.
Fitch
form

a

(

1970) had high and low self-esteem subjects peri-

task where they estimated the number of dots presented

tachistoscopically on

a

screen.

Subjects were presented with

success or failure feedback and then indicated their attri-

butions for their performance.

Low self-esteem subjects

more often attributed failure to internal factors (ability,
effort) and more often attributed successes to external fac-

tors (task easiness, luck) than did high self-esteem subjects,

although the latter difference was only marginally significant .

Both of the above studies are open to an important

methodological criticism.

Each study may have confounded

the effects of the size of the discrepancy between self con-

cept and feedback with the effects of the valence (success,

17

failure) of the feedback by their use of
standardized success and failure feedback. If high
self-esteem subjects in
the above studies had higher performance
expectancies than
low self-esteem subjects then the differences
between these
groups may simply have been due to the fact that
success

feedback was less discrepant from the self concepts
of high
self-esteem subjects while failure feedback was less discrepant from the self concepts of low self-esteem subjects
(this

interpretation will be referred to as the "differential ex-

pectancy" hypothesis).

If the self-esteem groups did not

differ in their performance expectancies, this would suggest
that these groups differ more fundamentally in the way they

process new information about themselves, with high self-esteem subjects biasing new information in

a

more self-enhanc-

ing manner than low self-esteem subjects

(

this" interpretation

will be referred to as the "differential interpretation" hy-

pothesis).

Evidence for the differential interpretation hy-

pothesis was obtained by Eagly (1967) who observed the self

concept changes in high and low self-esteem subjects following success and failure feedback.

Eagly tailored the feed-

back to hold constant the size of the discrepancy between expected performance and the feedback.

High self-esteem sub-

jects changed their self concepts toward the success and

away from the failure feedback, whereas low self-esteem subjects changed their self concepts toward the failure and

away from the success feedback.

18

The present study attempts to
replicate the Eagly (1971)
finding. Additional features of the
present study include
the use of a no-feedback control group,
and the measurement
of subjects' attributions for their
performance and their

evaluations of the test.
The above predictions refer only to the
conditions

where subjects do not expect further public evaluation.

Where subjects expect such evaluation no differences
are
predicted between the self-esteem groups.

This prediction

is based on analyses of situational vs. trait predictors of

behavior (Mischel, 1968; Rotter, 1954).

These authors have

argued that in highly structured situations in which few of
the person's responses can meet with reinforcement, indivi-

dual differences are less useful as predictors of behavior

than situational variables.

On the other hand, where the

situation is structured such that any response is likely to
be appropriate,

situational variables are less useful as pre

dictors than individual differences.

ment it is argued that some situations

In the present experi,

more than others,

impose constraints on self -evaluative behavior.

Self-evalua

tion that occurs in private without any expectancy of further evaluation presents the person with few cues as to ap-

propriate responses, and, therefore, individual difference
variables (e.g. self-esteem) should help to predict behavior.

Self-evaluation under the expectancy of further pub-

lic evaluation, it is argued, imposes clear constraints on

.
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the range of appropriate responses.

Because of the social

norm against immodest self-evaluation,
it is predicted that
where further public evaluation is imminent,
both high and
low self-esteem subjects should react to
feedback in a

self-effacing manner.
Self-monitoring.

Recently, Snyder (1974) has developed

personality scale which purports to assess the degree
to
which a person attends to and modifies his/her behavior
a

so

that it is socially acceptable.

The end points of this di-

mension are described as follows:
An "ideal type" self-monitor is a person who,
out of a concern for social appropriateness, is
particularly sensitive to the expression and selfpresentation of others
and uses these cues as
guidelines for monitoring and managing his own selfpresentation and expressive behavior." In contrast,
the prototypic non self -monitoring person- has little concern for the appropriateness of his presentation and expression, pays less attention to the expression of others, and monitors and controls his
presentation to a lesser extent. His presentation
and expression appear to be controlled from within
rather than by situational and interpersonal
specifications of appropriateness.
(Snyder, 1972,abstract
.

.

.

.

.

.

)

In the present study it is predicted that high self-

monitoring subjects will react to feedback in

a

more self-

effacing manner than low self-monitoring subjects in the ex-

pectancy of further public evaluation conditions, because of
the greater concern on the part of high self -mointoring sub-

jects that their behavior be appropriate.

However,

the

self-monitoring groups should not differ in the no expect-
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ancy

of further evaluation conditions since
in these conditions the question of the appropriateness
of self-evaluative

behavior is irrelevant.
Once the expectancy of further public
evaluation is
removed it is predicted that the differences
between the
.

self-monitoring groups in the expect further public
evaluation conditions will disappear since after the
expectancy is
removed the issue of appropriateness of self -evaluative
be-

havior is no longer relevant.
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CHAPTER

II

METHOD
Sub jects

Subjects were 300 female undergraduates
who received
credits which counted toward their psychology
course grades
in return for their participation in the
study.
The data
from 31 subjects are not presented because they
failed

to re-

turn for the second session of the experiment.

Another 63

subjects are not considered because their initial self
concept ratings were either too high (n

=

62)

to allow the presentation of the feedback.

or too low (n -

1)

Twenty-one sub-

jects who were suspicious of the cover story were also eli-

miniated.

Thus 185 subjects were included in the analyses

which follow.
Procedure
The experiment involved two one-hour sessions.

met in groups that ranged in size from

2

Subjects

to 9.

At the beginning of the first session subjects were
told that they were not to talk with one another during the

experiment and that they were to identify themselves only by

birthdate on all questionnaires.

Subjects first filled out

the "Stanford Self-Assessment Inventory" where they indi-

cated, among other things, their standing on the dimension
of clinical and social sensitivity, the amount of informa-

tion on which this rating was based, and the certainty with

,

which they had rated their standing.

The dimension of sen-

sitivity was chosen as the focal one in
the present study
because of its ubiquity in self descriptions

(Jones et al .

1974), and because during pre-testing subjects
indicated

that their "ideal self" rating on this
dimension was higher
than their "real self" rating, t(51) =
12.21,

£<

.001.

Subjects next filled out the "Personal Reaction Inventory" which contained the self-esteem (Eagly, in
press) and
the self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) personality scales.

Subjects at this point read

a

description of the cover

story and of the procedures to be followed in the experiment.

After subjects had finished reading the description,

the experimenter repeated in different words what subjects

had read and then answered any questions.

were told that the experiment was part of

Subjects read and
a

series of stud-

ies concerned with the effects of counseling and testing.

While other studies in this series were said to have focused
on the long term effects of counseling and testing, the present study was said to focus on the more immediate reactions

of subjects to taking an ability test and receiving feedback

about their performance.

first session

of

Subjects were told that during the

the experiment they would take

a

test of

clinical and social sensitivity and that during the second

session they would receive feedback about their performance.

Clinical and social sensitivity was defined as the ability
to understand and to act effectively in complex social situa-
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tions.

The test which subjects would
take was called the
Stanford Clinical and Social Sensitivity
Test (SCSST), and

was said to have been used in several
studies around the
country where it had proven to be a
"reasonably reliable and
valid test." In fact the test was contrived
for use in the
present study.

After answering any questions about the cover
story and
the procedures, the experimenter administered
the SCSST

which

consisted of two five-minute segments of videotape
followed

by two questionnaires where subjects rated various
aspects of
the tapes (e.g. the anxiety level of the participants,
the

level of involvement of the participants, etc.).

tape portrayed

interviewed

a

a

therapy session in which

a

The first

female therapist

male alcoholic, and the second tape portrayed

two female friends discussing their jobs.

The "actors on the

videotapes were four graduate students.
After completing the SCSST subjects filled out the "Mood
Rating Questionnaire" and wrote

a

initial reactions to the test.

Subjects were then dismissed

brief description of their

from the first session.
At the beginning of the second session subjects read

over one of two written forms which described the procedures
to be followed and which introduced the expectancy of fur-

ther evaluation (all subjects in

a

given session were assign-

ed to the same expectancy condition).

The forms explained

that most subjects would soon receive feedback about their

«
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performance on the SCSST but that some subjects
were in
control group which would not receive any
feedback.

a

The

form went on to explain that as soon as the
feedback had
been passed out and subjects had a chance to
examine it,
all subjects would fill out a questionnaire.

Expectancy of further public evaluation

The expect-

.

ancy manipulation involved varying the time at which subjects learned that they would undergo further public evaluation.

Half of the subjects were told about the further eval-

uation at the beginning of the second session while the otner
half were not told until after they had filled out the postfeedback questionnaire.

Thus at the time they filled out

the post-feedback guestionnaire, half of the subjects ex-

pected to undergo further public evaluation and half did not
expect such evaluation.

The expectancy of further evalua-

tion was introduced in writing by the following:
At this (that) point you will be tested again
You will take two of the remaining sections of the
Stanford Clinical and Social Sensitivity Test.
That is, you will watch and rate two more interaction tapes that are part of the . .
test (the
tapes that you observed and rated during the first
session were taken from the short form of the test)
After you have completed today's test the experimenter and another graduate student
will
.
In this way you will rescore your tests by hand.
ceive feedback about how well you have done on today's test very shortly after you have completed
the test.
The feedback about your performance on
today's test will be presented verbally to you by
either the experimenter or the other graduate student in the small groups that will meet after you
have completed today's test. That is, the present
will be split into two groups for the
group . .
purposes of receiving feedback about today's test.
.

.

.

.

.

After you have received feedback about
you will be interviewed (in the small today's test
cerning your reactions to today's test groups) conand to the
feedback that you received.

After "subjects had read the above description
the experiment
er repeated the description in slightly
different
words.

Valence °£ feedback.

After subjects had been told of

the procedures to be followed they were presented
with feed-

back from the test that they had taken during the first
session of the experiment (the SCSST)

.

domly assigned to receive success,

Subjects had been ranfailure, or no feedback

with about one-third of the subjects assigned to each condition.

The experimenter was blind as to the valence of the

feedback presented to subjects.

Each subject in the success

and failure conditions received one of eleven paragraph-long

evaluations.

Each evaluation had been rated during pre-

testing by Thurstone's equal intervals technique (Green,
1954) in terms of its implications about the person's clinical and social sensitivity.

Subjects in the success and

failure conditions received feedback which was 15 points

higher or 15 points lower, respectively, than their initial
self ratings of sensitivity (which had been made on

point scale).

a

90-

Samples of each of the computer-written feed-

back messages are presented in Appendix A along with informa
tion about their Thurstone ratings.
Subjects had two minutes to examine their feedback (con
trol subjects received sample feedback forms on which the

feedback message had been blotted
out).
their feedback (or sample feedback

form)

After examining
subjects filled out

the "Post-Feedback Form" where they
indicated, among other
things, their attributions for their
test performance and
their second self rating of clinical
and social sensitivity.
As the experimenter passed out the
Post-Feedback Form he reinstituted the expectancy manipulation by
reminding subjects
in the "expect further public evaluation"
conditions that
they would soon be tested again and receive
further feedback
about their sensitivity.

After subjects in the "no expectancy

..."

conditions

had completed the Post-Feedback Form they were informed
of
the further evaluation and feedback about their sensitivity,
as was noted above.

At this point the experimenter passed out test booklets
and introduced the second half of the clinical and social

sensitivity test.

He then began to pl a y the next videotape

which portrayed two clinical psychologist trainees discussing their supervisor.
Remova l of the expectancy of further public evaluation .
The videotape had been recorded such that the picture and
sound on the machine began to "act up" after about 30 seconds
of tape.

The experimenter, feigning consternation, began to

adjust various nobs on the machine.

The machine "broke down"

completely after another 30 seconds had passed (i.e. the
picture and sound were both unintelligible).

The experimenter
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acted rather up set that
"this stupid machine seems
tQ be
acting up again." Subjects
were told that the s ame
proble ra
had come up two weeks
eeKs earlier
Parlor and 4-u
that, apparently, the
machine hadn't been correctly
repaired. After appearing
at a
loss for a moment about what
could be done, the experimenter
announced that:
"I gueS s we will just
have to
Qff
experiment." Subjects were told
to remain seated while
their credit forms were prepared.
A few seconds later the
experimenter feigned a sudden burst of
insight. That is,
he "remembered" that there were
some questionnaires left over
from an earlier experiment and
"concluded" that the subjects'
data could be used in that experiment.
The experimenter then
retrieved these questionnaires (called the
"Post-Experiment
Questionnaire") from an adjoining room and
apologized that
parts of the questionnaire would be redundant
with others
that subjects had filled out.
Subjects were nevertheless

^

^

.

asked to "bear with us" and answer all of the
questions on
the questionnaire.
Subjects were told that as soon as they

finished the questionnaire the experiment would be
completed
and they were to then place all of the forms they had
filled

out into

a

box at the side of the room.

The Post-Experiment

Questionnaire included items where subjects rated their
clinical and social sensitivity, their evaluations of the
test,

their mood state, and their suspiciousness about the

cover story.
Finally,

subjects were debriefed.

The experimenter de-
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monstrated that the tape machine was
still in working order,
and explained that the Stanford
Clinical and

Social Sensiti-

vity Test was bogus and that therefore
subjects should make
nothing out of the feedback they
received.
The hypotheses
of the experiment were then explained.
To reinforce

the de-

briefing message,

a

videotape segment was presented were one

of the actors in the first set of tapes
appeared again and
repeated the debriefing that the experimenter
had presented.

Debriefing appeared to be extremely compelling in
disabusing
subjects of the deceptions employed in the study. 1

Measuring Instruments
The format of each of the five questionnaires which sub

jects filled out is described below.
1)

The Stanford

S

el f -Assessment Inventory was composed

of 33 items which asked subjects to rate themselves on 10

different dimensions (e.g. knowledge of chemistry, law; intelligence, athletic ability, clinical and social sensitivity), and to indicate their certainty of and the amount of

information upon which each of the self ratings was based.
The only data reported here concerns subjects' ratings of

their clinical and social sensitivity

.

After reading

a

paragraph-long definition of clinical and social sensitivity
subjects rated their standing on this dimension on

point graphic rating scale.
the scale:

a

90-

Five anchors were included on

average grade school student (13 points); aver-

age high school student (30 points); average college student

.

.
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(55 points);

average social caseworker (68 points);
average

professional psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist (81
points). After rating their average
sensitivity

subjects

responded to three 9-point bipolar rating
scales on which
they indicated:
a) the certainty associated

with their self

rating of sensitivity; b) the importance of
sensitivity;

c)

the amount of information they had about their
level of sensivity.
2)

The Personal Reaction Inventory was

a 6 6 -item

per-

sonality scale composed of 20 items comprising the self esteem scale (Eagly, in press), 25 items comprising the

self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974), and 21 filler items.
Subjects were dichotomized on the basis of their responses
to the self-esteem and the self -monitoring scales.

The cor-

relation between these two measures was quite small

(r =

-.05, n = 185, n.s.).

The internal consistency of the self-

esteem scale was somewhat higher than that of the self-monitoring scale (split-half reliabilities were .822 and .479,
respectively)
3)

The "Mood Rating Form" consisted of fifteen 30-

point graphic rating

Only the data from the

scales.

scales relevant to the hypotheses were analyzed
7

.

7

Six of the

scales were combined to yield an overall index of elation -

depression

.

The end-points of the scales were defined by

the following ad j ective pairs
vs. cheerful, happy vs.

vs. good,

sad,

:

elated vs. depressed

,

gloomy

pessimistic vs. optimistic, bad

and pleased-with-self vs. displeased-with-self

30

The internal consistency for
this index was quite nigh (coefficient alpha = .898). Coefficient
alpha values were computed according to the formula
discussed by Bohrnstedt
(1972).

On the seventh scale subjects
rated their calmness
vs. a nxiousness
tne end points of this scale were
defined
by two clusters of adjectives: calm,
relaxed, at-ease vs.
jittery, nervous, tense).
(

4)

4 of

The "Post-Feedback Form" was composed
of

which will be discussed here.

5

items,

The first item was

a

70-

point graphic rating scale where subjects rated
their clinical and social sensitivity .

This scale included the same

anchors as described in (1) above except that the numerical

values of each anchor were adjusted to take into account the
fact that the present scale had 70, not 90 points.

The rea-

son for not having the present scale be identical to that

used for the first self rating was to minimize the salience
of the fact that subjects were rating themselves again on
the same dimension.

The second item was

a

40-point graphic

rating scale on which subjects indicated their attribution
for their test performance.

were defined as:

"I was

The end points of this measure

completely responsible

— that

is:

my ability and motivation were the only factors which contributed to my performance" vs. "Factors which lie outside of

myself were completely responsible

— that

is:

luck,

character-

istics of the test, and/or characteristics of the testing sit-

uation were the only factors which contributed to my perform-

ance."

The third and fourth items were manipulation
checks

where subjects indicated their expectancies
concerning the
possibility of further evaluation and their ratings
of the

valence of the feedback, respectively.
was made on

a

The former rating

dichotomous scale where subjects indicated

whether they thought they would undergo further evaluation
or whether they were unsure about what to expect during the

remainder of the experiment.
a

The latter rating was made on

5-point bi-polar rating scale.
5)

The "Post-Experiment

scribed in four parts.

Questionnaire" will be de-

The first part consisted of six 20-

point graphic rating scales on which subjects evaluated the
test.

Only the data from three of these scales were analyzed

as the other three scales were filler items.

The three

scales were combined into an index of the positivity vs

gativity of sub jects
combined were:

'

evaluations of the test

confusing vs. straightf oward

valid, and unfair vs. fair.

.

.

ne -

The scales

valid vs. in-

,

The internal consistency of this

index was reasonably high (coefficient alpha

-

.652).

The second part of the questionnaire was in all but one

respect identical to the questionnaire described in

(1)

above, the only difference being that on the present ques-

tionnaire the "average college student" anchor had been re-

moved from the scales where subjects rated their standing on
the various dimensions.

These anchors were removed so as to

allow subjects to more easily change their self ratings of

clinical and social sensitivity between
the self rating immediately following feedback and the final
self rating.
it
was felt that the many subjects who
rated themselves at or
near this anchor would be unwilling to change
their self rating between these two measurements unless
the salience of
such a change was minimized by removing the
anchor.
The third part of the questionnaire was identical
to
the "Mood Rating Form" described in

(

3

)

above.

The final part of the questionnaire consisted of two

open-ended questions where subjects described their perceptions of the purposes of the experiment and any questions or

doubts they had about the cover story.

Subjects' responses

to these two items were content analyzed by two independent

judges who were blind to the subjects' experimental condition
Subjects' responses were rated by the judges as:

"not at all

suspicious", "somewhat suspicious", or "very suspicious."

Inter-judge reliability was high (r
and, where the two judges disagreed,

=

n

.83,
a

=

206, p_<.001);

third independent

judge determined the suspiciousness rating

.
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CHAPTER

III

RESULTS
All analyses of variance and covariance were
performed

.

by

a

multivariate computer program (Finn, 1972).

Due to the

slight inequality of cell size (the largest of the six
cells

contained 34 subjects, the smallest contained 29 subjects),
tests of effects were computed so as to adjust each effect
for all others at an equal or lower level of design complex-

ity (cf. Chaiken and Well, 1974; Overall and Spiegel, 1969).

Manipul ation Checks
The success of the valence manipulation is suggested by
the significant valence main effect for subjects* ratings of
the valence of the feedback, F( 1,179)

=

316,97,.

£< .001.

Subjects who received success feedback rated it as being more

positive than did subjects who received failure feedback (Ms
=

3.95, respectively, where

1.40,

tive and

5

=

1

=

feedback was very posi-

feedback was very negative).

who received success feedback reported

a

Also, subjects

higher level of cli-

nical and social sensitivity immediately following feedback

than did subjects who received failure feedback,
86.42,

£<

.001; Ms

=

F( 1,178)

=

57.54, 47.54, respectively, where 0 =

very little sensitivity and 90

=

a

great deal of sensitivity.

Subjects in the "expectancy of further public evaluation" conditions reported on the "Post-Feedback Form" that

they expected further public evaluation to

a

greater degree

'
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than did subjects in the "no expectancy

£(1,179)

where

=

1 =

468.23, p<.001; Ms

==

1.03,

.

conditions,

.

1.92, respectively,

expect further public evaluation and

2

= do

not know what to expect.

Self-Enhancement and the Expectancy of Further Public Evalua tion
Self concept change

.

The self-enhancement and the ex-

pectancy of further public evaluation hypotheses, taken together, led to the prediction of a valence by expectancy in-

teraction on subjects' self ratings of clinical and social
sensitivity immediately following feedback.

The inclusion

of no feedback control groups made it possible to answer the

question:

"Did subjects in the success conditions change

their self concepts more toward the feedback message than

did subjects in the failure groups?"

This answer was ob-

tained by generating the following special contrast:
cess -(minus) Control" vs. "Control - Failure".

"Suc-

The con-

trast compared the difference between the success and control
groups'

self ratings with the difference between the failure

and the control groups'
(Myers,

19 72;

self rating.

The contrast weights

Myers, personal communication) used to compute

this contrast and its interaction with the expectancy inde-

pendent variable are presented in Table

1.

A more thorough

discussion of the rationale for the weighted analysis of
variance is presented in Appendix

B.

The predicted valence of feedback by expectancy inter-

TABLE

1

Contrast Weights Used for Analysis of Covariance
of
Self Concept Ratings Immediately Following
Feedback

Valence of feedback
Group
Success

Failure

Control

Valence main effect
Expect further public evaluation plus the do not expect
further public evaluation
groups

+1

+1

-2

Expectancy main effect

Expect further public evaluation
Do not expect further public

-1

evaluation

Valence by expectancy interaction

Expect further public evaluation
Do not expect further public

evaluation

+1

+1

-2

-1

-1

+2

a

The expectancy main effect was computed by ignoring
(summing across) the valence factor this is indicated by
the dotted lines.

—

action for subjects' self ratings
of clinical and socxai sensitivity immediately following
feedback was marginally significant, F(l, 17 8) = 2.90,
Neither the valence nor
£ <. 10
the expectancy main effects
approached significance (F<1 in
both cases). In this analysis
subjects' initial self rating
.

of their sensitivity served as
a covariate.

Table

2

presents

the means for the valence by expectancy
interaction (note
that the means presented correspond to
the logic of the contrast weights noted in Table 1). As can
be seen in Table 2,
the means are in the predicted directions.
Single degree of

freedom contrasts (Myers, 1972, pp. 352-356)
revealed that
where subjects did not expect further public evaluation

they

raised their self concepts more following success than
they
lowered their self concepts following failure,

£<.10.

3.72,

F( 1,178)

=

Where they expected further public evaluation

subjects lowered their self concepts following failure

slightly more than they raised their self concepts following
success, F(1,178)<1, n.s.

Attributions

.

Predictions parallel to those made for

self concept change were made for subjects' attributions for

their test performance

action was predicted.

— i.e.

a

valence by expectancy inter-

However, no special weighted contrasts

were employed since no predictions were made concerning the

extent to which the success and failure groups would differ
from the control groups.

simply

a

2

x

3

factorial.

Thus the design of the analysis was
No significant differences were
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TABLE

2

Mean Adjusted Self Ratings of
Clinical and
Social Sensitivity Immediately
Following Feedback

Valence of feedback
Group
SuccessControl

ControlFailure

+3.92

+5.48

+7.81

+2.86

Expectancy
Expect further public
evaluation
Do not expect further

public evaluation

Note. Means are .adjusted for covariance on initial
self rating of clinical and social sensitivity.
Positive
numbers refer to self concept change toward the feedback,
adjusted for changes in the control groups.

were obtained for either of the
main effects or for the valence by expectancy interaction, F(1,179)<1
in each case.
Evaluation of the test. A third prediction
involved
only the self-enhancement hypothesis.
It was predicted that
subjects' evaluations of the validity,
etc., of the test

would produce

a

main effect for valence of feedback.

No

predictions were made as to the size of the differences
between the success and the failure groups relative
to the

control groups, and therefore no special contrasts
were employed.
torial

Thus the design of the analysis was

a

2

x

3

fac-

.

The analysis of variance revealed the predicted main

effect for valence of feedback, F(2,179)

=

10.33,

£<.001.

Neither the expectancy main effect nor the valence by ex-

pectancy interaction approached significance,
1.57; F(2,179) = 1.06, respectively.

F( 1,179)

=

Subjects in the suc-

cess condition evaluated the test most positively (M

=

20.27), and subjects in the failure condition evaluated the

test most negatively (M

=

12.89), with control subjects in-

termediate in their evaluation (M

=

19.07).

The range of

possible scores on the evaluation index was from -20 (very
negative evaluation) to +40 (very positive evaluation).
Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed significant dif-

ferences between the success and the failure groups, F(l,
179) = 18.08,

£<.001; and between the failure and the con-

trol groups, F( 1,179)

=

12.29, p

<

.001; but no significant
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difference between the success
and the control groups, F(l,
179X1, n .s. The data suggest, then, that
while subjects'
defensively devalued the test following
failure there was
no corresponding tendency for
them to evaluate the test in
a

self-enhancing manner following success.
Other measures.

Subjects' responses to three other

questionnaire items yielded unpredicted main
effects for the
valence of feedback:
subjects' final ratings
of the amount

of information they had about their level
of clinical and
social sensitivity, their certainty rating
for their final
self ratings of sensitivity, and their rating
of the amount
of feedback they had received, F(2,178)

=

10.77,

£<.001;

F(2,178)

= 4.96,

tively.

Neither the expectancy main effect nor the valence

£<.01;

F< 1,179)

=

15.39,

£<.001, respec-

by expectancy interaction approached significance on these
three items.

None of these analyses employed special con-

trasts and they were thus of

a

2

x

3

factorial design.

The

analyses of the amount of information and the certainty items

employed as covariates subjects' initial self ratings of the
amount of information and the certainty with which they rated

their clinical and social sensitivity, respectively.

The

analysis of subjects' ratings of the amount of feedback they
had received employed no covariate.

Inspection of T^ble

3

reveals that subjects who received

success feedback were most certain of, and claimed to have
the most information about, their level of clinical ^nd so-

40

TABLE

3

Mean Ratings of Certainty and Information
Concerning
Final Self Rating of Sensitivity
and of the Amount of Feedback

Valence of feedback

Questionnaire it em
Success

Failure

Control

Certainty 3 of final self
rating of sensitivity

6.53

6.06

5.71

Amount of information upon
which final sensitivity
rating is based

5.54

4.77

4.03

Amount of feedback received

0
2

1 - 39

-

30

„

b

Note . The scales ranged from 1 = no certainty, no information to 9 = much certainty, much information; and 1 =
small amount of feedback to 5 = large amount.
a

Mean ratings of certainty and information are adjusted
for initial ratings of certainty and information, respectively, that were made at the beginning of the experiment.
Control group subjects did not respond to this item.

cial sensitivity, followed by
subjects in the failure group,
and the control groups, respectively.
Also, subjects in the

success group claimed to have received
more feedback than
did subjects in the failure group.

Single degree of freedom contrasts
revealed that subiects in the success group reported
having significantly
more information about their level of
sensitivity than either
the failure or the control groups, F(
1,178) =
5.77,

£< 1,178)

=

21.52, £<.00l, respectively;

£<.025;

and subjects in the

failure group reported having more information than
subjects
in the control group, F( 1,178}

=

16.59,

£<.001.

Single de-

gree of freedom contrasts for the certainty item yielded

a

significant difference only for the success vs. control contrast, F( 1,178)

=

8.05,

£<.01,

Neither the success vs.

failure nor the failure vs. control contrast was significant,
F( 1, 178)

=

2.73,

£<.20; F(l,178)

=

1.47,

£<.25; respec-

tively.

Subjects' mood ratings revealed significant main ef-

fects for valence of feedback on the elation-depression and
the calmness-anxiousness dependent measures, F(2,178)

=

10.14, £<.001; F(2,178) = 7.06, £<.005, respectively.

Neither the expectancy main effect nor the valence by ex-

pectancy interaction approached significance on these two
measures.

These analyses involved no special contrast

weights and thus the design was

a

2

x

3

factorial.

Initial

self ratings of elation-depression and calmness-anxiousness

during the first session served as
covariates.

Inspection of Table

4

reveals that "success" subjects

were more elated and more calm than
"control" subjects, F(l,
178)

=

tively.

19.62, £ <.001; F< 1,178) = 7.14,
2 <.001, respec-

Success subjects were also more elated and
more

calm than failure subjects, F(l,178)
178)

=

9.56, p_<.001, respectively.

=

19.62, p_<.001; F(l,

Finally, control sub-

jects were slightly more elated and slightly less calm
than

failure subjects, F(1,178)

=

2.00,

£<.25;

F( 1,178)

=

0.14,

n.s., although these differences were not significant.

Self Presentation Versus Self Concept Change
It was predicted that the self-effacing responses of

subjects in the expectancy of further public evaluation con-

ditions would shift toward self -enhancement once this ex-

pectancy was removed.

The predicted valence by expectancy

by time (before removal of the expectancy of further evaluation vs. after its removal) interaction was not obtained,

F(1,178)<1, n.s.

Neither did the time, valence by time,

or expectancy by time effects approach significance, F(l,

178)<1, n.s.; F(l,
respectively.

178)

=

1.22, n.s.; F(1,178)<1$ n.s.,

Special (weighted) contrasts were employed in

the above analysis, and subjects' initial self rating of cli-

nical and social sensitivity served as

Trait Determinants
Self-esteem.

r£_

a

covariate.

Response to Success and Failure

It was predicted that:

(a)

when subjects
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TABLE

4

Mean Adjusted Ratings of Two
Moods

Questionnaire Items

Uroup

Elation-depression

Calmness-Anxiousness

Valence of feedback
Success

34.51

23.32

Failure

12.95

20.29

Control

19.94

20.84

Note. Means are adjusted for covariance
on initial
self rating of elation-depression and
respectively. The scales ranged from: calmness-anxiousness
-90 = vlry depressed
to^+90 = very elated; and from 0 = very
anxious to 30 - very
calm.
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did not expect further
public evaluation, high
self-est eem
subjects would change their
self concepts .ore toward
success
and less toward failure
than low self-esteem
subjects; a nd
(b) when subjects expected
further public evaluation no
such
differences between the self-esteem
groups would be obtained.
Thus a valence by expectancy
by self-esteem interaction
was
predicted for subjects' self
ratings of clinical and social

sensitivity immediately following
feedback.

In this analy-

sis the special contrast weights
were again employed (see
Table 1) with the addition that
high self-esteem w a s weighted
(+1)

and low self-esteem was weighted
(-1)

tor in the design.

as

the third fac-

In this analysis subjects' initial
self

rating of sensitivity served as the cov
a ri a te.
The predicted three-factor interaction
was not obtained,

F(1,172)<1,

n .s.;

nor were the self-esteem main effect or

the self-esteem by expectancy interaction
significant, F(l,
172) = 1.84, n.s.; F(1,172)<1, n.s., respectively.

Only

the self-esteem by valence interaction
approached signifi-

cance, £(1,172)

=

3.69,

sented in Table

5

suggests that high self-esteem subjects

£ <.10.

The pattern of means pre-

changed their self concepts more toward success and less toward failure feedback regardless of the expectancy condition.

Single degree of freedom contrasts revealed marginally significant differences between the self-esteem groups at the

"success-control," and the "control-failure" levels of the

valence factor, F(l,172)

=

2.38,

£<.20;

P( 1,172). = 3.55, p_<
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TABLE

5

Mean Adjusted Self R a tings
of Clinical and Social
Sensitivity Immediately Following
Feedback

Valence of feedback

Group

Success-control

Control-failure

Self-esteem
High
Low

MS

+ 7.34

+ 2.03

+4.17

+ 6.12

adjusted for init ^l self rating of
sensiffvf
sensitivity
nH
and are averaged over the expectancy
factor
nUmbSrS
t0 SSlf COnCeP t change towarf the*
feedb^v
feedback message, adjusted for changes
in the control group.
S
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.10,

respectively.

No significant differences
involving the self-esteem
factor were observed on subjects'
attributions for their
test performance, or on their
evaluations of the test.

Self-monitorinq

it w a s predicted that when
no further

.

public evaluation was expected,
the self-monitoring groups
would not differ in their
reactions to feedback, but
that

when further evaluation was expected,
high self -monitoring
subjects would be more self-effacing
in their reactions to
feedback than low self-monitoring
subjects.
This analysis
employed special contrast weights
and employed subjects' initial self rating of sensitivity as
cov
a

Table

6

for subjects'

presents

a

a ri a te.

summary of the analysis of covariance

self ratings of clinical and social sensitivity

immediately following feedback.
interaction was not obtained.

The predicted three-factor

Ignoring the small magnitude

of this interaction and examining the cell means
in Table
reveals that where subjects did not expect further
public
evaluation, self -monitoring

as

,

7

predicted, did not help pre-

dict responses to the feedback /Self monitoring main effect,

F(l,172)<

n.s.;

1,

F(1,172)<1, n.s^/.
evaluation,

a

self-monitoring by valence interaction,
However, where subjects expected further

significant valence by self-monitoring interac-

tion was obtained, F(l,172)

=

4.93, p_<.05.

While this lat-

ter interaction w a s predicted, the pattern of means is the

opposite of what was predicted.

That is, low self -monitoring
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TABLE

6

Summary of Analysis of Cov
a ri a nce for Self Rati
stings of
Clinical and Social Sensitivity

Immediately Following Feedback

Source of variance

df

MS

Self-monitoring (SM)

1

3.27

SM by valence

1

116.24

3.27*

*

SM by expectancy

1

3.39

SM by valence by expectancy

1

60.79

172

35.59

Within cells (error)

*£ <

.

10

<1
1.71
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TABLE

7

Mean Adjusted Self Ratings of Clinical and
Social Sensitivity Immediately Following
Feedback

Valence of feedback
Group

.

Success-conctrol

Control-failure

High self-monitoring

+7.47

+3.05

Low self -monitoring

+0.56

+7.83

Expect further public
evaluation

Do not expect further

public evaluation
High self-monitoring

+9.06

Low self-monitoring

+6.41

"

"

+3.36
+2.50

Note . Means are adjusted for initial self rating of
clinical and social sensitivity. Positive numbers refer to
self concept change in the direction of the feedback messages, adjusted for changes in the control group.

subjects tended to be more
self-effacing th a n high selfmonitoring subjects. This
finding, however, must be
viewed
with caution because of
the small magnitude of the
overall
three-factor interaction.
The only other effect
approaching significance was the
valence by self-monitoring
interaction.
Thus high self-monitoring subjects generally showed
a more self-enhancing response to the feedback than low
self -monitoring subjects.
Single degree of freedom contrasts
revealed that high selfmonitoring subjects changed their self
concepts more toward
success than toward failure feedback, F(
1, 172) = 3.58, p_ <
.10; while low-self-monitoring subjects showed
no such tendency, F(l,172)<l, n.s.
j

No support was obtained for the hypothesis
that self-

monitoring would help to predict responses to the
removal of
the expectancy of further public evaluation

(

F < 1 for self-

monitoring main effect and interactions involving self-monitoring)

.

Correlational Tests of Self Concept Model
The present self concept model led to two sets of pre-

dictions.

First, correlations were predicted among degree

of self concept change, attributions for test performance,

evaluation of the test, and mood following feedback.

Table

8 presents the results of correlational tests of these pre-

dictions.

The correlations presented are averages based on

the four conditions in which subjects received feedback, thus
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TABLE

8

Average Within-cell Correlations
Among Indices of
Self Concept Change,
Attributions,
Test Evaluation, and Mood

Variable
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

self concept change
post feedback minus initial self
rating

—

self concept change
final self rating
minus initial self
rating

—

evaluation of the
test
attribution for test
performance

(5)

elation-depression

(6)

calmness-anxiousness

Note.

(2)

53**

(3)

(4)

(5)

.21**

.17

.25**

.19

(6)

12

14

.24 *

*

.09

23**

.26**

.05

.06

.48

.46**

Positive correlations suggest support for the
hypotheses. Degrees of freedom are 114 for all correlatio
*p

< .05 (two-tailed)

**p < .01 (two-tailed)
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the sample consisted of 114
subjects, not 185 B . in earlier
analyses. Averages were computed
according to McN«m t r'i
(1955, pp.

148-149) formula.

Averaging of these four cells

seamed justified after initial t-tests
revealed that in only
4 of 90 comparisons did any two of the combined
correlations
differ significantly <£< .05) from one
another (on the basis
of chance alone 4.5 significant differences
would be expecL<•(]).

Inspection of Table

8

reveals that all of the correla-

tions are in the predicted direction, although only the
self

concept change, test evaluation, and elation-depression in-

dices are significantly correlated with one another in
sistent fashion.

a

con

When they received success feedback, sub-

jects who raised their self concepts most tended to evaluate
the test in

a

highly positive manner and reported

elated mood state.

n

highly

Similarly, when they received failure

feedback, subjects who lowered their self concepts to the

greatest degree tended to evaluate the test in
sitive manner and report

a

a

highly po-

highly depressed mood state.

The second set of predictions was that subjects with

high levels of certainty or prior information concerning
their initial self rating of clinical and social sensitivity
should show little self concept change following feedback.

Table

9

presents correlational tests of these predictions.

The correlations presented are averages based on the four
cells in which subjects received feedback.

TABLE

9

Average Wthla-c.ll Correlations
Between Self concept
Change and Prior
Information/Certainty about Self
Conoept

Variable
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(3)

(4)

Self concept change— post feedback
mmuc initial self rating

-.07

.01

Self concept change— final self
rating minus initial self rating

-.04

.03

Amount of prior information about
self concept

.66

Certainty associated with initial
rating of self concept

Note.
Positive correlations are consistent with the
hypotheses. Degrees of freedom are 114 for all
correlations
*£

<

.01
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inspection of Table

reveals no support for the
hypotheses, with the rasgn itude
of the correlations heing
close
to zero.

9
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CHAPTER

iv

DISCUSSION

Self-enh.nr^nt and the Expect.nc,
g

of Further Public

Ev^.

tion

The data generally supported
the self -enhancement hypothesis. Where they did not
expect further public evaluation,
subjects tended to a marginally
significant degree to change
their self concepts more toward
success than toward failure
feedback.
Subjects who received success
feedback reported
that they had received more
feedback, and that they were more
certain of, a nd had more information
about, their level of
clinical and social sensitivity, than
subjects who received
failure feedback. Finally, subjects who
received success
feedback evaluated the test more positively
than subjects who
received failure feedback, although only the
failure groups'
evaluations differed significantly from those of
the control
groups.

Two interpretations of the latter finding seem
plausible.

First,

since the control groups' evaluations of the

test were relatively positive,

a

ceiling effect may have

made it impossible for the success group to evaluate the
test more favorably than the control groups.

ceiling effect,

a

To test for

a

homogeneity of variance test was computed.

A ceiling effect would be suggested by lower variances in

the success and control groups.

As can be seen in Table 10,
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TABLE 10
Cell V^ri
anancea for the Test Evaluation
Index

Valence of feedback

Group

Success

Expect further public
evaluation

Failure

Control

76.37

115.74

83.89

93.88

105.80

90.04

Do not expect further

public evaluation
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the variances in the
failure groups are higher
than those
in the success or control
groups.
However, an F-max test
of homogeneity of variance
(Winer, 1971) revealed
that this
difference w a s not significant
(Fmax = 1.52, n.s.).
Also
arguing against a ceiling effect
is the f a ct that the
means
in the success and control
groups are approximately

'

(+20)

while the range of the scale is
from (-20) to + 40).
Thus,
subjects' responses in the success
and control groups do
not appear to be limited by
ceiling
(

effect.

a

A non-artifactual interpretation of the
above finding is
that the pre-feedback evaluation of the
test has implications
for the ways in which subjects respond
to feedback.
Where
the test is initially evaluated in
a very positive manner it
may be unnecessary for subjects who receive success
feedback
to enhance their evaluation of the test, since'it
is already
seen as leading to reliable and valid results.
Subjects who
fail on such

a

test, however, m a y have to either devalue the

test, or lower their self concepts.

Conversely, when

is initially evaluated very negatively,

a

test

subjects who receive

failure feedback should show no tendency to further devalue
the test,

since its results are, from the outset, considered

suspect.

Subjects who receive success feedback on such

a

test should tend to minimize its negative evaluation so as
to enhance their self concepts.

In the present study, then,

the initially positive evaluation of the test (as shown by
its evaluation by the control groups) may have meant that
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subjects in the success
conditions could enhance their
self
concepts without raising their
evaluation of the test whereas subjects in the failure
conditions may have had to devalue
the test as a defense
against lowering their self concepts.
This analysis could be tested
in future studies by varying
the perceived validity of the
test.
The failure of the attribution
item to support the selfenhancement hypothesis may have been due
to the ambiguous
wording of this item. Subjects indicated
"Who or what w a s
responsible" for their test performancethem selves, or factors which lay outside of themselves.
Recently, Fishbein
and Ajzen (19 73) have argued that many of the
contradictory

findings in the attribution theory

a re a

uous wording of attribution measures.

are due to the ambig-

Thus an attribution

question like the one above can be interpreted" simply in
terms of an internal vs. external locus of the cause of some
event, or in terms of intentional vs. unintentional behavior
(i.e.

subjects may think they are "responsible" only if they

intended for an event to occur).

If subjects adopted the lat-

ter interpretation then their attributions would be misleading,

since the present study is not concerned with the attri-

bution of intentionality, but simply with the locus of the
cause of test performance.

Future studies in this area should

use more specifically defined items to assess attributions.
For example, Stroebe, Stroebe, and Eagly (19 74) had subjects

pick one of two possible reasons for another person's beh?-
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vior, one of which „
a s internal

the other person.

3 nd

the other external

^

Such specificity reduces
error of raes surement by m ini mi2ing
confusion as to the level of
a ttribution being rated.
The weakness of the support
for the expectancy of further public evaluation
hypothesis ma y have been due to
two
differences between the Eagly
and Acksen (1971) a nd the present study.
First, in the Eagly and Acksen
study, subjects
expected further evaluation in
a one-to-one situation whereas in the present study subjects
expected to be tested in
groups.
The individualized contact
present in the E.gly and
Acksen study m a y have been necessary
to produce self-effacing responses to feedback.

Secondly, the weakness of the support
for the hypothesis
may have been due to differences in experimenter
characteristics in the two studies.
It would seem likely that the ex-

pectancy of further public evaluation should exert
stronger
effects when the experimenter is cold and/or
critical

in his/

her interactions with subjects.

While there are no data to

confirm such speculation, the experimenter in the present
study may have been less threatening to subjects than the

experimenter in the Eagly and Acksen study, and as such m
ay
not have induced as much self-effacing behavior. Future
studies might manipulate experimenter characteristics along
the warm-cold or the critical-accepting dimensions with the

prediction that the Eagly and Acksen findings would be most
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strongly supported when
the experimenter was
critical and/or
cold in his/her interactions
with the subjects.
Self Presentation Versus
, Self Concept Change
The present data failed
to support any distinction
between self presentation and
self concept change.
This failure may have been due to the
fact that subjects felt committed to the self rating that
they made immediately following
feedback and were thus unwilling
to make any dramatic shift
in their self-rating after the
removal of the expectancy of
further public evaluation. Recent
studies in the dissonance/
attitude change area suggest that after
having induced an
expectancy in a given situation (e.g. that
subjects will
write a counter-attitudinal essay), it is
difficult to then
remove the expectancy and obtain the results
that would have
been obtained had not the expectancy been introduced
at all
(e.g. Goethals and Cooper,

in press).

In everyday life,

changes in self presentation most often occur in
situations

which are widely enough separated so that the audience
for
one presentation will not also observe other, inconsistent

presentations (cf. Goffman, 1959. pp. 135-140).
It may be difficult to demonstrate the distinction be-

tween self concept change and changes in self presentation

because of the evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1965,
1969) which may attend inconsistencies in self-eva luative

behavior.

The notion that people should have consistent

views of themselves is widely shared (e.g. Gergen, 1971) in

60

sp.te of m uch evidence
which calls this notion
(e.g. Gergen, 19
68, 1971 Mischel
.

,

1968)

.

^

question

^^

unwilling to give evidence
of inconsistencies in
their selfevaluative behavior-particularly
when such inconsistencies
might appear self-serving.
Three ways to ra
ini m i ze such
9P -

prehension seem plausible.
First, self-evaluations might
be observed in situations
which are presented as independent
of one another.
l n the
present study, for example, subjects
might have been bold
that the experiment was over
after they had filled out the

post-feedback questionnaire.

Then, ostensibly having left

the experiment, they might have
been induced to participate
in a second (presumably unrelated)
experiment, during which

they would again rate their clinical
and social sensitivity.
Secondly, the set presented to subjects
might suggest
that variability in self-evaluative behavior
is quite normal.

[

Third,

self-evaluations might be monitored unobtrusively

in at least one of the situations employed
in the experiment
(e.g. by content analyses of verbal or written
self presen-

tations rather than by questionnaire responses).

Naturally

occuring changes in self presentations usually involve rather subtle variations in the wording of self-evaluations or
in the emphasis placed on various aspects of oneself, with

only

a

minimal amount of self-consciousness.

Such changes

may be inhibited by forcing subjects to rate themselves on
clearly defined rating scales.
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Self-esteem
The present data fit

simpler pattern than was
expected with regard to
self-esteem. No support was
obtained for
the notion that self-esteem
would help predict subjects'
responses to feedback only when
they did not expect further
evaluation. Instead, regardless
of the expectancy condition, high self-esteem subjects
more often accepted success
and less often accepted failure
feedback than low self-esteem
subjects.
The present findings are consistent
with those of
Eagly (1967), Fitch (1970), a nd Stroebe,
Stroebe, and Eagly
(1974).
Interestingly, the magnitude of the
valence by
self-esteem interaction was smaller in
the two studies (the
a

present study and Eagly, 1967) where the
size of the discrepancy between initial self concept and
feedback was held
constant than in the two studies where this
discrepancy was
not held constant. Table 11 presents the valence
by expectancy interactions obtained in the four studies.
Thus, when defined in absolute terms,

success feedback

is often more consistent with the self concepts of high
self-

esteem subjects while failure is more consistent with the
self concepts of low self-esteem subjects, and subjects tend
to accept feedback which is consistent with their existing

self concepts more than feedback which is discrepant from

their self concepts.

However, even when the size of the

discrepancy between expected and actual performance is held
constant, high self-esteem subjects still react to feedback

TABLE 11

Results of Analyses of
Variance for Self-est eem by
Valence of Feedback Interaction
in fFour Experiments

Experiment

Eagly (1967)
Present study

Fitch (1970)
Stroebe, Stroebe,
and Eagly (1974)

MS

df

2.27

1, 32

4. 60

<. 050

131.85

1,

172

3. 69

<• 056

18.02

1,

112

6. 09

<. 025

11. 00

<• 002

a

1, 52

This information w a s not presented in the
original article.
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in

more self-enhancing
manner than low self-esteem
objects.
This latter trend
may
expiained
hypoth is
that the learning history
of low self-esteem
subjects h as
been replete with fail
ures to perfom up fcQ
a

^

^

^

^

^

=xes whereas high self-estee
m subjects have more
often m*t
and/or exceeded their
expectancies for performance.
Such
longitudinal issues require much
more study.
The present data did not
support the hypothesis that
self-esteem would help predict
subjects' responses to feedback only in the no expectancy
of further evaluation conditions.
This failure may stem from
mistaken assumptions in

Mischel-s (1968, 1973) analyses of
trait vs. situational determinants of behavior. Mischel s
position has been that a
negative correlation exists between
the usefulness of trait
'

and the usefulness of situational
predictors of behavior.
He argued:
"To the degree that subjects are
exposed to powerful treatments, the role of individual
differences

will be minimized.

Conversely, when treatments are weak,

ambiguous, or trivial, individual differences
should exert

significant effects" (Mischel, 1973, p. 276).
the present view suggests

a

In contrast,

dimension whose end points cor-

respond to those described by Mischel, but which includes

a

middle ground in which both trait and situational variables
help to predict behavior.

Further, it is argued th*t in

mos t psychological experiments, situational variables cannot
res trict the range of subjects' responses to such

a

degree
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that trait variables cannot
predict behavior-few experimenters are able to make subjects
"an offer they can't refuse'' (The Godfather
Puzo, 1969).
Recently, Cronbach (1975)
has pointed out the growing
tendency toward construction of
complex matrices which combine
trait and situational variables in order to predict behavior.
Clearly, it makes little sense to think of situational
and trait variables as mutually exclusive predictors of behavior—
in all but the most
extreme (and usually trivial) cases both
traits and situational variables can help in such predictions.
,

In the present study it was found that the
expectancy of
further public evaluation does not restrict the
range of possible responses to feedback enough to preclude the
useful-

ness of the self-esteem trait variable in the prediction
of

self-evaluative behavior.
Self -monitoring

A conservative interpretation of the data suggests,
simply, that the self -monitoring hypotheses were not con-

firmed and that self-monitoring was not related to subjects'
self concept and/or self presentational changes following

feedback.

Ignoring the lack of significance of the predicted

three-factor interaction, and examining the simple two-factor

valence by self-monitoring interactions at each level of the

expectancy factor, led to
the hypotheses.

a

conclusion

which contradicted

That is, where they expected further evalu-

ation, low self-monitoring subjects were more self-effacing

than high self -monitoring subjects,
whereas the predicted
result was exactly the reverse. In
addition, self-monitor-

ing was (contrary to the prediction)
not related to subjectsresponses to the removal of the expectancy
of further evaluation.
Interpretation of this latter failure is
difficult,
h-wever, because of the fact that the removal
of the expectancy itself did not lead to the predicted results.
Because
of the plausibility of the relationship between
self -monitoring and self presentational processes, further
attempts

should be made to test the present hypotheses.

Correlational Tests of Self Concept Model
The present data partially support the hypothesized

links between self concept change, attributions and mood.

Although the attribution variable was not consistently correlated with self concept change or mood,

a

conceptually re-

lated variable, subjects' evaluations of the test, was sig-

nificantly correlated with these variables.

The elation-

depression mood scale was consistently correlated with the
self concept and test evaluation measures while the calmness-

anxiousness scale was not.

This finding might suggest that

success and failure experiences more involve the elation-

depression than the calmness-anxiousness dimension except for
the fact that both of these mood scales generated significant

main effects for the valence of feedback factor in the analysis of variance.

An inconsistency exists, then, between

the correlational data and the experimental data concerning

the calmness-anxiousness
dimension.

An explanation of this

inconsistency might be that
this latter scale was
a relatively unreliable one,
based as it was on a single
item

while the elation-depression
measure was based on six items.
The support for the present
self concept model is limited by the correlational
nature of
the data linking self con-

cept change with test evaluation
and mood.
Futher research
might experimentally manipulate
one or more of these variables while observing the
concomitant changes in the others.
For example, subjects' attributions
for their test performance might be manipulated by exposing
them to a model who
either internalizes or externalizes
responsibility for his/
her performance.
Subjects exposed to the "internalizer « model should change their self concepts
to a greater degree fol-

lowing feedback, and should show greater
changes in mood
than subjects exposed to the "externalizes"
model.
The data did not support the hypothesis
that the amount
of prior information and certainty about
one's self concept

should be negatively correlated with the degree of
self con-

cept change following feedback.

This failure may have oc-

curred because subjects in the present study may not have

differed from one another enough in the amount of information and/or certainty concerning their initial self ratings
of

clinical and social sensitivity.

Thus

a

m ight explain the failure of the hypothesis.

earlier, Rotter (1954) reported

a

restricted range
As was noted

study which manipulated the

67

amount of prior Information
presented concernlng
performs on a Xeve! of aspiration
task . High amQunts
information were associated
with small shifts in level
of
aspiration following feedback,
it may be necessary to
experimentally vary the amount of
information which subjects
have about themselves in order
to demonstrate the link
between prior information and self
concept change. Alternatively, it may be possible to
find self concept dimensions
where subjects differ more in the
amount of information they
have about themselves than they did
in the present study.

^
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FOOTNOTES

We

no problems appeared to exist
in disabusing sub-

jects of the deceptions employed
in the study, one subject
apparently experienced some distress
over her participation
in the study. This subject had
been going through a long
period of depression and apparently felt
very happy when she
learned that she had done well on the test
(i.e.
she was in

the success condition). When she found out
that the test and
feedback were fake this apparently "burst her
bubble" of good
feelings she had had and sent her into an even more
depressed
state for at least

a

couple of days.

This particular incident points out how difficult it is
to do experimental research with self concept phenomena.

Perhaps in the present study some screening procedure could

have been used so as to exclude subjects who were feeling

particularly depressed or who were under emotional stress.

77

APPENDIX A

Below are listed the 11
feedback

Usages

that were pre

sented to subjects in the
present study and the Thurstone
values that were established for
each during pre-testing.
The Thurstone values refer to
ratings made by 51 pre-test
subjects who rated the implications
of each of the feedback
messages on a scale where "0" implies
that the person referred to in the message is extremely
deficient in social sensitivity and "90" implies that the person
has an extraordinary amount of sensitivity.

Statement #1 (Thurstone scale value

=

80.90).

Your Performance on the test of clinical
social sensitivity w a s excellent, your score and
is one
of the highest that has ever been recorded
for a
college student. Your responses showed an extremely well developed ability to make sense out
of complex social interactions. Your perceptions of social situations were highly sophisticated and realistic much more so than those of many students who
are training to become professional psychotherapists
or psychiatrists.
.

—

Statement #2

(Thurstone scale value

=

69.71).

Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was very much superior to that
of the average college student. Your responses
showed a highly .developed ability to make sense out
of complex social situations.
Your perceptions of
social interactions were generally quite sophisticated
and realistic much more so than those of most college students.

—

Statement #3

(Thurstone scale value

=

65.90).

Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was very much above the average
for college undergraduates. Your responses showed

S
well developed abili-K/
™
S SSnSe ° ut of ^ornPlex social situation. Y v
*
interactions were very soohi^^S' 10115 ° f soci
a

——

i

^

^nos^
*

-o

Statement #4 (Thurstone value

=

62.88).

Your performance on the fpcf rt -P -i
social sensitivity „ a s above
thf aver-q^for
lege undergraduates. Your
responses^™ ,2
•

•

uie average college undergraduate.

Statement #5

(Thurstone value = 59.75).

Your performance on the test of
social sensitivity was slightly above clinical and
the average
e
d
Your responses showed
a sua
slightly above average ability
lege undergraduates) to make sense(relative to colout of complex
social situations.
Your perceptions of social interactions were occasionally more sophisticated
and
realistic than those of the average
undergraduate.

^ ™^ates.

Statement #6

(Thurstone value = 54.65).

Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was about average for
a college
undergraduate. Your responses showed an average
ability (relative to college undergraduates) to
make sense out of complex social situations. Your
perceptions of .social interactions were about as.
sophisticated and realistic as those of the average
undergraduate.

Statement #7

(Thurstone value

=

49.22).

Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was slightly below the average
for college undergraduates.
Your responses showed
a slightly below average ability (relative to college undergraduates) to make sense out of complex
social situations.
Your perceptions of social interactions were occasionally less sophisticated and
realistic than those of the average college student.

Statement #8

(Thur stone value =45.43).

Your performance on the test- of r*n~social sensitivity „ as
below the average for col*f
lege underaraHnatoc
v
i

^ ™-

n
ad "
make SeJe
°*
ociai siSa
tlons^
tions.
Your perceptions of social
intertr+f™"
less sophisticated and
realistic than those of
f f-Z^
the
average undergraduate.

Statement #9

(Thurstone value

=

38.88).

Your performance on the test
social sensitivity was very much of clinical and
inferior to that
Y ° Ur "^seslhowed
a marked lack of ability to
make sense out of comolev
social situations.
Your perceptions of soc 1
actions were generally quite naive
and unrealisticmuch more so than those of most
college students!

marLd^lacTor^Vr^;
.

Statement #10

(Thurstone value

=

33.57).

Your performance on the test of clinical
and
social sensitivity was very much below
the average
for college undergraduates.
Your responses showed
a poorly developed ability (relative
to college
undergraduates) to make sense out of complex
social
situations.
Your perceptions of social interactions
were very unsophisticated and unreal! stic—
much more
so than those of most college undergraduates.
_

Statement #11

(Thurstone value = 27.00).

Your performance on the test of clinical and
social sensitivity was very inadequate.
Your score
was among the worst that has so far been recorded
for a college student.
Your responses showed a very
poorly developed .ability to make sense out of complex social situations. Your perceptions of social
interactions were very naive and unrealistic much
more so than those of many high school students.

—
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APPENDIX B
Weighted contrasts were
employed to assess whether
subjects in the success condition
raised their self concepts
more than subjects in the failure
condition lowered their
self concepts following feedback.
The valence main effect
contrast, then, compared the
difference in self concept ratings between the success and control
groups with the difference between the failure and control
groups.
This contrast
can be represented algebraicly as
follows (let
=
S

F = failure,

and C = control group):

Simplifying this expression yields:

-

/_~(S-C)

(S+F-2C).

success,

(c-F) ~.

Thus the

contrast weights for the valence main effect
were:
P = +1,

and C = -2.

S

=

+1,

The valence main effect was thus on one

degree of freedom (Myers, 1972; Myers, personal
communication).

The expectancy main effect was computed with the
"ex-

pect further evaluation" condition weighted +1 and the "do
not expect further evaluation" weighted -1.

The valence by

expectancy interaction was computed with cell weights that
were determined by multiplying the "valence" weight with the
"expectancy" weight associated with each cell in the design.

Weighted contrasts were employed only on the self concept dependent variables since only with regard to these va-

riables were predictions made as to the extent to which the
success and failure groups would differ from the control
groups.

